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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
“Arbitrary and Capricious” is a moniker that has enjoyed 
common usage since the passage of the Administrative Procedures 
Act (APA), which mandated that a regulatory agency must refrain 
from rulemaking in such a manner.1  To that end, the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 requires that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“Commission”) consider a rule’s effect on the 
promotion of efficiency, competition, and capital formation.2  The 
primary purpose of the Commission is investor protection.3  Since 
executive agencies have been granted the power to create and enforce 
rules, there has naturally been a friction between the regulators and 
those who are regulated.  While members of the Commission are 
only to be removed for cause,4 they are still political appointees and 
subject to political pressure like most other members of the 
government.  Sometimes they have to be reined in by the other 
branches through our system of checks and balances. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit recently 
overturned Exchange Act Rule 14a-11, holding that the 
Commission’s promulgation of the rule was arbitrary and capricious 
in regard to several issues because it failed to consider the rule’s 
                                                          
* Raymond E. Areshenko is a third year Juris Doctor and Master of Dispute 
Resolution candidate at Pepperdine University School of Law.  Raymond 
graduated from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University with a Bachelor of Science 
degree in Professional Aeronautics.  He thanks his family, friends, professors, and 
peers for their support and guidance during the writing process.  Contact: 
Raymond.Areshenko@pepperdine.edu. 
 
1 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (requiring that a reviewing court shall set 
aside and hold unlawful any agency actions, findings, or conclusions when the 
court finds that the agency promulgated the rule in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner). 
2 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2006); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 
80a-2(c) (2006). 
3 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006). 
4  Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935) (a 
Commissioner may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, 
or malfeasance in office). 
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effect on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.5  The 
Commission declined to seek further review with the U.S. Supreme 
Court.6  The Court of Appeals, expressing a bit of frustration by 
stating that the Commission “failed once again,” found that the 
Commission inadequately determined the likely economic 
consequences of its rule upon efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation.7  In addition, the court found that many other APA 
requirements germane to the promulgation of Rule 14a-11 were 
completely ignored by the Commission.8 
 Rule 14a-11 was part of the enormous rulemaking directive 
that the passage of The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) gave the Commission.9  
Rule 14a-11 was designed to allow shareholders to force a 
company’s management to include shareholder-nominated board of 
director candidates on the company’s proxy ballots.10  The primary 
way shareholders of publicly traded companies vote for directors and 
other resolutions is through the use of proxy materials that the 
                                                          
5 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  The 
primary challengers to the rule were the Business Roundtable and the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce.  Id. at 1144.  See also id. n. 17. 
6 Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Press Release 2011–179 (Sep. 6, 2011), 
available at http:/www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-179.htm [hereinafter 
Schapiro Press Release].  The Commission confirmed that it will not seek a 
rehearing or U.S. Supreme Court review of the decision to vacate the rule.  
However, it will continue to analyze the decision and submitted comments, with 
the goal of making rules that will provide shareholders with further opportunities to 
nominate directors.  Id. 
7 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1147–48.  The court stated that the 
Commission committed another instance of arbitrary and capricious rulemaking in 
this case, repeating similar errors that they recently made in American Equity 
Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 167–68 (D.C. Cir. 2010), and 
in Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
8 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d  at 1148–56. 
9 Kathleen L. Casey, Commissioner, Speech at Commission Hearing: The 
Regulatory Implementation and Implications of Dodd-Frank (Jan. 23, 2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch012311klc.htm (referring 
to the Commission’s rulemaking authority to adopt new proxy access rules as 
“discretionary”); see also Michael Lyle et. al., Dodd-Frank, One Year Later: A 
Primer On The Federal Rulemaking Process, THE METROPOLITAN 
CORPORATE COUNSEL, at 30 (Aug., 2011), available at 
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2011/August/30.pdf. 
10 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1147. 
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company distributes to each shareholder at certain intervals, usually 
some period before the annual shareholder meeting.11  This process 
could be likened to the absentee ballots commonly used in the United 
States where a voter is mailed voting materials ahead of time.  Rather 
than waiting to go to the polls on the day of the election, the voter 
fills out the ballot and returns it in the mail by a predetermined date.  
Rule 14a-11 required a publicly traded company to include 
information on, and the ability to vote for, shareholder-nominated 
candidates for director positions (“dissident directors”).12  The basic 
requirements a shareholder or group of shareholders had to meet in 
order to nominate a candidate for election to the board of directors 
were: ownership of three percent of the company’s voting stock 
(usually common stock), holding that amount for at least three years, 
holding it through the election, and having no intent to effect a 
change of control.13 
It is clear that the Commission wishes to put more restrictions 
on the management of companies.14  With the ever-present pressure 
of politics upon agencies, it is exceedingly important for the courts to 
firmly guard against arbitrary and capricious encroachments upon 
companies, as such encroachments are not useful regulations that 
maximize shareholder value and protect their interests.  Although 
many people may view business regulation as unimportant in their 
daily lives, there are actually serious implications for most.  For one, 
the population is increasingly reliant on their own retirement and 
investment accounts to support themselves in their later years.  
National stories about the wide spread failure, or impending failure, 
                                                          
11 Id. at 1146–47. 
12 Id. at 1147.  The rule applied to companies subject to the Exchange Act, to 
include investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act.  Id.   
13 75 Fed. Reg. 56675 (Sept. 16, 2010).  There were four basic requirements 
to be able to nominate a candidate: that the shareholder or group of shareholders 
own at least three percent of the voting shares of the company, held that amount for 
at least three years from the date of submitting the nomination, hold them through 
the election, and intend to continue holding them after the election.  Amongst many 
other requirements was declaring that the shareholder or group harbored no intent 
to effect a change of control of the company, and that the shareholder or group has 
no direct or indirect agreements with the company in regards to a nominee.  Id.  
14 Schapiro Press Release, supra note 6 (reaffirming her commitment to 
making it easier for shareholders to nominate director candidates with the goal of 
making boards more accountable for their actions). 
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of pension plans to meet their funding obligations are common.  
These failures are widespread in a range of fund types including 
those operated solely for a single company, to large funds 
representing hundreds of thousands of government workers.  
Moreover, most private employers have shifted from the more 
traditional defined-benefit pension plans, to defined-contribution IRA 
and 401k plans, placing greater responsibility on individual workers.  
Inadequacy (and future unreliability) of Social Security payments is a 
growing concern.  Even most state and local government pensions 
are paid from funds which invest heavily in publicly traded 
companies.  Because of this, it is very important that the management 
of publicly traded companies have adequate oversight.  But equally 
important is preventing the government from imposing unnecessary 
expenses on companies and their shareholders, or devising machinery 
whereby others can impose these burdens that will hamper their 
competitiveness in our increasingly competitive and global 
marketplace. 
Part II of this case note will briefly discuss the historical 
background of the Commission and its rule-making power, and how 
Rule 14a-11 came to fruition.  Part III will outline the basic facts of 
this case15, including the points and arguments made by opponents 
and proponents of Rule 14a-11.  Part IV will provide more in-depth 
facts, analyze the points made by the parties, and detail how the court 
ruled on each issue.  Finally, Part V will discuss the impact that this 
ruling may have on the business of publicly traded corporations in 
the future, along with how this may affect future Commission 
rulemaking.   
Of further note, other rules and modifications to rules were 
announced by the Commission in the same releases containing 
Rule14a-11.16  The Petitioners made various arguments related to 
some of these other issues in the same lawsuit and these are outside 
the scope of this particular court ruling and thus not included in this 
case note.17  Unless otherwise stated, “Petitioners” refers to the 
                                                          
15 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144. 
16 75 Fed. Reg. 56668 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
17 Id.; Pet’r’s Opening Br., Final Brief of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Respondent, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014799 (D.C Cir. 
Feb. 25, 2011) (No. 10-1305).  The other issue most predominantly addressed in 
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primary parties seeking review, the Business Roundtable, and the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce.18  Unless otherwise stated, the 
“Respondent” is the Commission. 
 
II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The APA was enacted in 1946 in response to the increased 
number of regulatory agencies during the Roosevelt administration.19  
Fear of unelected regulators and their authority to effectively 
promulgate and administer new laws led to the desire to limit the 
administrative agency concept.20  Some even feared that this would 
result in a form of government that resembled communism and 
would operate on ulterior motivations and promulgate arbitrary 
directives.21 
Under the APA’s standard of review, an agency rule or 
regulation must not be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
                                                          
the final release, and in Petitioners’ and Respondent’s briefs, was the alteration of 
Rule 14a-8.   
18 The state of Delaware filed a brief as Amicus Curiae in support of 
overturning the rule.  Br. of the State of Delaware as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Pet’r, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014797 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 24, 2011) (No. 
10-1305).  Seeking to overturn the rule as applied to registered investment 
companies, the Investment Company Institute and Independent Directors Council 
also filed a brief of Amici Curiae.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Investment Company 
Institute and Independent Directors Council in Support of Pet’r’s And Vacatur as 
Applied to Registered Investment Companies, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 
2014798 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 25, 2011) (No. 10-1305). 
19 George B. Shephard, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure 
Act Emerges From New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1558–59 (1996) 
(George B. Shephard is an Assistant Professor of Law at Emory University School 
of Law). 
20 Id. at 1559.  The APA was debated in the 1930’s and 40’s, a time when 
communism was a very real and imposing threat the public.  To supporters of the 
New Deal, these agencies were simply designed to promote efficiency–to others it 
was the creeping of communism into the government.  Id.  The debate over the 
APA stemmed from a fight over the New Deal generally, and the APA’s passage 
was ultimately a cease-fire that favored New Deal proponents.  Id. at 1559–60. 
21 See generally Id. at 1557.  While modern society has become accustomed 
to administrative agencies promulgating regulations, this was a much newer 
concept for the U.S. during the New Deal era.  Id.  In addition, there was no 
standard of review with which an aggrieved party could contest what they believed 
to be onerous regulations.  Id. 
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otherwise not in accordance with the law.22  In relating the arbitrary 
and capricious standard to a given agency decision, the court must 
determine the reasonableness of the agency decision and if the 
decision is lacking in foundation.23  A court shall determine that an 
agency has acted arbitrarily and capriciously if it (1) totally fails to 
consider a significant part of the problem with the proposed rule, (2) 
explained its decision using evidence that runs counter to the 
explanation, or (3) is based off a conclusion that is so unlikely to 
match reality that it cannot be ascribed to differences in view.24  
Courts use a narrow standard of review for determining whether a 
rule is arbitrary and capricious and do not substitute their own 
judgment for that of an agency.25  However, they must still be sure 
that the Commission “examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a 
satisfactory explanation for . . . the facts found and the choice 
made.”26 
When the Commission establishes regulations, it is required 
to comply with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.27  When 
making rules applicable to investment companies, the Commission 
must follow the Investment Company Act of 1940.28  In addition to 
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review required by the APA, 
the Commission is uniquely required under the Exchange Act to 
consider whether a rule will unduly burden efficiency, competition, 
or capital formation.29  In addition to the present case, the 
Commission’s rules were invalidated on three other recent occasions 
                                                          
22 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006); Alaska Dep’t. of Envtl. Conservation v. 
EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 465 (2004). 
23 Kaufman v. Kansas Dep’t. of Soc. and Rehab. Services, 811 P.2d 876, 884 
(Kan. 1991). 
24 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 43 (1983) (finding the NHTSA’s rescission of the passive restraint requirement 
in Standard 208 was an arbitrary and capricious action). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78. 
28 Investment Company Act of 1940 is codified as 15 U.S.C. § 80. 
29 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(f), 78w(a)(2), 80a-2(c) (2006), the Commission is 
unique in that it is required to become informed of the consequences its rule-
making may have on efficiency, competition, and capital formation in order that its 
rule-making does not cause more harm than help to those considerations than it 
helps.  
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for failing to consider efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation.30 
Rule 14a-11 was designed with the goal of facilitating 
shareholder ability to nominate and elect directors to a company’s 
board of directors.31  The most important way shareholders may 
influence a company is through voting power, which enables all 
owners of a company’s voting stock to elect directors.32  The 
Commission viewed the 2008 financial crisis as emblematic of the 
need for shareholders to be able to effectively exercise this power, 
and it determined that the need was not being fully met under the 
current rules.33  The Commission focused on the proxy process 
because its purpose is to come as close as possible to replicating the 
in-person voting process for shareholders.34  After a comment period 
                                                          
30 Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chamber 
of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (the court held that the 
Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously when promulgating a rule requiring 
mutual fund companies to have a board of no less than 75% independent directors, 
as opposed to the current 50% requirement, and to have an independent chairman); 
American Equity Life Insurance Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 167–68 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (the court held that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously when 
considering the effect of efficiency, competition, and capital formation when the 
Commission declared that fixed indexed annuities were not annuities pursuant to 
the Securities Act).  The Commission must make a thorough effort in order to 
determine as best as they can the effects of their rulemaking.  Chamber of 
Commerce, 412 F.3d at 144; American Equity, 613 F.3d at 166.  Where the 
Commission fails to become fully knowledgeable (thus depriving the public and 
the Congress of knowledge) of the facts and considerations of the economic results 
of the proposed rule, the subsequent promulgation of that rule is arbitrary and 
capricious.  Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 144.  
31 75 Fed. Reg. 56668 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
32 Id. at 56669.  Noting that one of the core methods shareholders have to 
influence the operation of a company is by right to participate in the elections of 
the company’s directors.  Id. 
33 Id. at 56669–70.  The Commission felt that there were questions of 
whether company boards were providing adequate oversight of management, 
whether they were focused on shareholder interests, and whether boards should be 
more accountable for their decisions regarding risk management and compensation.  
Id. 
34 Id. at 56670.  The Commission reasoned that the proxy voting process is 
not similar enough to voting at the meeting because most proxy voting shareholders 
cast their ballots well before the shareholder meeting, resulting in a missed 
opportunity to nominate a director or view the materials regarding another 
shareholder-nominated director.  Id. 
    
Fall 2012 Business Roundtable v. SEC  727 
in which the Commission received a series of sharply divided 
comments, it decided that state laws governing shareholders’ ability 
to include their director nominees in the company’s proxy voting 
materials were insufficient.35  The final version of Rule 14a-11 
provided that a shareholder or group of shareholders meeting certain 
requirements could force the company to include its director nominee 
on the company’s proxy materials.36  Traditionally, how or whether 
shareholders can nominate a candidate for a director position are 
issues of state law and a company’s bylaws.37  Rule 14a-11 was 
designed to reach all companies subject to the Exchange Act, with 
the ability to opt-in, but not opt-out.38 
 
III.  FACTS 
 
The Commission announced its intent to publish 14a-11 in 
June 2009, outlining the proposed terms of the rule and inviting 
                                                          
35 75 Fed. Reg. 56670–71 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
36 Id. at 56674–75 (requiring that the shares have voting power, be equal to 
at least three percent of the company, that the three percent that has been held for at 
least three years, and that the shareholder or group intend to keep the shares 
through the election).  To illustrate the potential size of these groups, three percent 
of the largest company on the Fortune 500, Wal-Mart Inc., is $5,482,929,000 as of 
March 25, 2011.  Forbes 500, Full List (Oct. 5, 2011), available at 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2011/full_list/.  Three percent 
of the smallest company on the Forbes 500, Seaboard Corp., is $84,450,000.  Id.  
Proxy materials would have to include information about the shareholder and the 
shareholder’s ability to vote for the nominee.  75 Fed. Reg. at 56677. 
37 Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware 
Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1784 (2006) (relating Delaware law as 
a reflection of their legislative preference for private ordering and flexibility to 
create and alter securities law).  It is well known that corporations of any 
significant size tend to incorporate in Delaware.  Id. at 1749.  Moreover, it would 
be well beyond the scope of this writing to examine the securities law of every 
state.  Delaware is the only state that filed a brief in this case, and the laws of no 
other states were given any significant consideration during the promulgation of 
this rule, by the parties to this case, or by the court.  (Lawrence A. Hamermesh is a 
Ruby R. Vale Professor of Corporate and Business Law at Widener University 
School of Law). 
38 75 Fed. Reg. 56678–79 (Sept. 16, 2010).  Barring conflict by state law or 
a company’s governing documents that were in compliance with applicable state 
law, Rule 14a-11 would be mandatory for any applicable company.  
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comment.39  The Commission received hundreds of comments that 
ranged from letters by experts to in-depth economic and legal 
reports.40  After an opportunity to review the comments and make 
adjustment to the proposed rule, the Commission published the final 
version of Rule 14a-11 in the Federal Register on September 16, 
2011.41  The Commission scheduled Rule 14a-11 to take effect on 
November 15, 2010, but it never went into effect as they stayed the 
rule pending the outcome of this case.42  Because the APA provides 
for review motions to be submitted directly to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals, the Petitioners sought review with that court shortly after 
Rule 14a-11’s promulgation.43  The Petitioners argued against Rule 
14a-11 on several points asserting that the Commission promulgated 
the rule arbitrarily and capriciously by inadequately and improperly 
measuring the effect of the rule on competition, efficiency, and 
capital formation.44  A three-judge panel heard oral arguments on 
April 7, 2011, and issued its unanimous (there was no concurring 
opinion either) ruling in favor of the Petitioners and vacating Rule 
14a-11, on July 22, 2011.45  The Commission subsequently stated 
                                                          
39 Proposing Release, 74 Fed. Reg. 29024 (June 18, 2009). 
40 See generally Adopting Release, 75 Fed. Reg. 56668 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
41 75 Fed. Reg. 56668 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
42 Press Release, No. 33-9259, SEC (Oct. 14, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final.shtml. 
43 Pet’r’s Opening Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2010 WL 5116461, at *1 
(Feb. 25, 2011) (No. 10-1305).  The Investment Company Act provides that any 
party or entity who is aggrieved by rules promulgated by the Commission may 
obtain a review of the rule by the United States Court of Appeals within their 
corresponding jurisdiction, or by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  
15 U.S.C. § 80a-42(a) (2006).  The petitioner must, within sixty days of the order, 
request that the rule be either modified or set aside partially or in entirety.  Id.  No 
review will be granted on any basis not previously objected to (or a show of good 
cause for failing to object) during the comment period, or other similar public input 
mechanism.  Id.  Any Commission findings as to facts will be upheld so long as 
they were supported with “substantial evidence . . . .”  Id.  The judgment and 
decree of the reviewing court will be final, and subject to review only by a grant of 
certiorari by the United States Supreme Court.  Id. 
44 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146–47 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  
45 Id. at 1144.  Again, the court in this case only ruled on 14a-11, without 
considering all of the arguments the Petitioners brought, and without ruling for the 
Petitioners on all factors they argued. 
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that it would not seek review of the decision with the U.S. Supreme 
Court.46  
The court found that the Commission failed to adequately 
consider the economic consequences of Rule 14a-11 when 
formulating the rule.47  The Commission noted that the rule imposed 
the cost of printing and mailing materials about the shareholder 
nominated candidates onto the companies rather than the nominating 
group.48  Nevertheless, without basis, it decided that those costs, 
amongst many other costs such as opposing the candidate, would be 
outweighed by the benefits to shareholders who no longer had to 
print and mail their own materials.49  Moreover, the Commission 
concluded without sufficient evidence that the mere presence of these 
dissident shareholders would increase board productivity and overall 
value to shareholders.50  The court also pointed out that the 
Commission ignored the issue of how the rule will affect the total 
number of proxy contests because the adopting release did not 
address the extent to which Rule 14a-11 will make traditional proxy 
contests available under applicable state corporate laws.51 
The court agreed that the Commission failed to consider how 
special interests, namely institutional investors such as unions and 
government pension funds, would employ the rule for their own 
                                                          
46 Schapiro Press Release, supra note 6. 
47 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148–50.  The court determined that the 
Commission inconsistently framed the costs and benefits of the rule; failed to 
estimate necessary cost figures; and generally failed to assess the “likely economic 
consequences of Rule 14a-11 and to connect those consequences to efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation.”  Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 1150.  Petitioners provided estimates ranging from $4 million to $14 
million at large companies and $800,000 to $3 million at smaller companies.  Id.  
These costs would include media and public relations efforts, advertising through 
various means, consultants, and the time of employees and managers.  Id.  
Moreover, the court found that the Commission opportunistically assumed frequent 
rule use when measuring benefits, but infrequent rule use when addressing costs.  
Id. at 1154. 
50 Id. at 1149. The Commission took these costs into consideration, but did 
not necessarily agree as to the amount and concluded that the benefits of Rule 14a-
11 would be worth anticipated costs.  Id. 
51 Id. at 1153.  The court reasoned that without this information, there would 
be no way to know whether the rule will be a net benefit.  Id. 
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ends.52  In its adopting release, the Commission reasoned that the 
shareholder ownership requirement would limit any undue use of 
Rule 14a-11 by special interest groups.53  However, the court found 
that the Commission ignored compelling arguments and studies that 
indicated how special interests could gain disproportionately more 
towards their own objectives with the use or threat of dissident 
directors than any marginal increase in value they would otherwise 
receive with or without a dissident director.54  Moreover, the court 
agreed with the Petitioners that these special interests could burden a 
company with the significant costs of a proxy fight simply by 
threatening to nominate a dissident.55   
The State of Delaware submitted a brief of amicus curiae in 
support of the Petitioners, arguing that Rule 14a-11 directly overrode 
and contradicted Delaware corporate law.56  The court declined to 
address that issue, as moot, since they vacated the rule without 
having to address Delaware’s argument.57  The court also declined as 
moot the Petitioner’s argument that the rule violated First 
Amendment free speech rights.58    
                                                          
52 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d. at 1151–52.   
53 75 Fed. Reg. 56766 (Sept. 16, 2010).  Because shareholders would need to 
own at least three percent of the company for at least three years, groups who met 
this requirement would have demonstrated a long-term commitment to the 
company.  Id. 
54 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1152 (rebutting the Commission’s reasoning 
that it was sufficient protection that shareholders would have the opportunity to 
view the company’s argument against a special interest nominee and not vote for 
that candidate).  The court agreed with Petitioners that even if a dissident board 
member was ultimately not elected, the company could expend significant 
resources fighting the election, or even the threat of nomination.  Id.  Also, the rule 
placed no restriction on what the relationship was to the nominating shareholder 
group.  75 Fed. Reg. 56675 (Sept. 16, 2010).  Only one dissident nominee would 
have to be included in the materials and the shareholder or group with the largest 
voting block would have their nominee included in the materials, regardless of 
which shareholder or group was the first to nominate a candidate.  Id.  
55 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1152. 
56 Final Br. of the State of Delaware, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 
2014797, at *2, *7 (Feb. 24, 2011) (No. 10-1305) (arguing that Rule 14a-11 
conflicts with Delaware law’s “private ordering” right which permits shareholders 
to internally self-regulate the way a company handles its affairs). 
57 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149. 
58 Id. at 1156. 
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Lastly, the court took issue with the inclusion of investment 
companies in the rule.59  Investment companies, such as mutual 
funds, are often directed by a board that is overseeing more than one 
fund.60  If shareholders from a specific fund were able to nominate a 
dissident director who then wins a seat on an investment company’s 
board, the board would be required to hold separate meetings for only 
that fund, since a dissident director would not be privy to board 
discussions about other funds.61  The Commission did not completely 
ignore this dilemma, but attributed whatever costs would be incurred 
as stemming from the rights shareholders have to nominate director 
candidates under state corporate laws.62  The Commission concluded 
that in any event, the benefits of Rule 14a-11 justified the costs.63  
Moreover, the Commission acknowledged that fewer fund 
shareholders would utilize the rule because funds have a greater 
number of retail customers who fail to meet the Rule 14a-11 
qualification threshold and because investment companies are not 
necessarily required under state law to hold annual meetings.64  The 
court finally determined that the Commission used circular logic to 
justify application of the rule to investment companies and to justify 
its belief that the rule’s lesser use by investment company 
shareholders would result in lower overall cost.65   
 
                                                          
59 Id. at 1154. 
60 Id. at 1154.  Typically, the boards of many investment companies are 
either unitary boards that oversee all of the funds in the group, or cluster boards, 
which are multiple boards within a group that each oversee a number of funds.  Id.  
The court cited a survey that indicated that eighty-one percent of boards are 
unitary, and fifteen percent are cluster.  Id. 
61 Id. at 1154.  The court noted the obvious inefficiencies of a system where 
a board that before included discussion of a certain fund, amongst other funds, at its 
meeting now had to convene additional meetings for that particular fund in order to 
include a dissident board member elected to that specific fund.  Id. 
62 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1154. 
63 Id. at 1155.  The Commission acknowledged Rule 14a-11 would result in 
inefficiencies, increased costs, and that the use of Rule 14a-11 would likely be 
lower than other publicly held companies.  They dismissed this in conclusory 
fashion by stating that the benefits justified the costs.  Id.  
64 Id.   
65 Id. at 1156. 
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IV.  SUMMARY OF OPINION 
 
The court agreed with the Petitioners that the promulgation of 
Rule 14a-11 was arbitrary and capricious.66  Since the court 
determined that Rule 14a-11 was arbitrary and capricious before 
analyzing all the points, they declined to address the Petitioners’ 
argument that the Commission arbitrarily rejected the argument that 
individual company shareholders could propose proxy access rules 
for their own companies.67 
 
A.  Consideration of Economic Consequences 
 
Given that the Commission is charged with considering a 
rule’s effect on “efficiency, competition, and capital formation,” the 
Commission asserted that Rule 14a-11 “may have the potential of 
improving board accountability and efficiency and increasing 
shareholder value.”68  The court first addressed the Commission’s 
conclusion that Rule 14a-11 would result in shareholders receiving 
direct savings because of reduced costs for printing and postage to 
distribute information about the nominee to the other shareholders.69  
The Commission estimated that those costs would be approximately 
$18,000 for each nominee, in addition to numerous other costs.70  
The Commission hypothesized that Rule 14a-11 will reduce 
shareholder concerns about collective action and free-riders, which 
occur when all shareholders receive the “benefit” of expenditures 
made by other shareholders.71   
                                                          
66 Id. at 1148.   
67 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148. 
68 Id. at 1149 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56761). 
69 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56756). 
70 75 Fed. Reg. 56756 (Sept. 16, 2010).  The Commission reasoned that 
shareholders would be more likely to use Rule 14a-11 because of the savings that 
would result from not having to do their own mailings.  Id.  In addition, the 
Commission cited comments that the mailing alone only represented about 5% of 
the cost of nominating a director candidate due to the costs of advertising, 
attorneys, obtaining shareholder lists, public relations, proxy solicitors, etc.  Id.  
The commission disputed commentators who noted that a “’mere $18,000’” did not 
justify the expense of the rule.  Id. at 56757. 
71 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149.  Free-rider and collective-action 
concerns relate to the apprehension shareholders may have towards spending a 
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The court pointed out that the Commission designed Rule 
14a-11 to impose upon companies the cost of preparing, printing, and 
mailing the required disclosures and other solicitations related to a 
director campaign.72  The court also cited the Commission’s 
recognition that the rule could have an adverse effect on the 
performance of the company and the board due to, for example, the 
distraction to management of a proxy fight.73   The court noted the 
Commission’s conclusion that Rule 14a-11 would still “promote the 
‘efficiency of the economy on the whole,’ and the benefits of the rule 
would ‘justify the costs’ of the rule.”74  The Petitioners’ primary 
economic arguments were that the Commission “neglected both to 
quantify the costs companies would incur . . . and to substantiate the 
rule’s predicted benefits.”75  They also stated that the Commission 
“failed to consider the consequences of union and state pension funds 
using the rule” or to “properly evaluate the frequency with which 
shareholders would initiate election contests.”76   
 
                                                          
significant sum to get a nominee elected to the benefit of the rest of the 
shareholders while the paying shareholder or group only gets a fractional benefit.  
75 Fed. Reg. 56756.   
72 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56678) (discussing 
the complexity expense of various other issues related to 14a-11 such as priority of 
shareholder nomination when a current dissident director is getting ready to leave, 
legal advice specific to each company’s situation, and the costs of court fights 
between the companies and shareholders). 
73 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56765).  The 
Commission acknowledged that election contests are “distracting and time-
consuming” to a company’s board and management; that companies may have to 
reevaluate and possibly change their own procedures for facilitating shareholder 
nominations; and that the rules could result in lower quality boards if unqualified 
individuals were elected.  75 Fed. Reg. 56765; see also Pet’r’s Opening Br., Bus. 
Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014800, at *32 (Feb. 25, 2011) (No. 10-1305). 
74 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56771/3).  The 
Commission concluded that the Rule’s “possible” benefits of improved board 
accountability and company performance justified the acknowledged costs and 
would “promote the efficiency of the economy on the whole.”  
75 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149. 
76 Id. 
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1.  Consideration of Costs and Benefits 
 
The Commission acknowledged that companies might spend 
significant sums of money to fight shareholder-nominated board 
candidates.77  However, the Commission argued that these costs 
would be limited by a couple of factors.  First, to the extent that 
managers have a fiduciary duty to desist from expending company 
funds to fight shareholder nominees for “no good-faith corporate 
purpose,” the managers may elect to simply include the nominees on 
the proxy material.78  Second, the requirements that a shareholder or 
shareholder group must collaborate in order to qualify to nominate a 
candidate would limit the number of nominees for a board to 
contest.79   
The Commission did not seem to dispute the cost figures for 
conducting a proxy fight, which were submitted by various 
commenters.80  The Petitioners argued that the Commission failed its 
duty by neither endorsing the figures provided nor providing its own 
estimate.81  In any event, the Commission suggested that they might 
be “discretionary” costs because Rule 14a-11 imposed no obligation 
upon any company board or executive to fight a shareholder 
                                                          
77 75 Fed. Reg. 56770 (Sept. 16, 2010) (“[B]oards may be motivated by the 
issues at stake to expend significant resources to challenge shareholder director 
nominees . . . . We therefore recognize that . . . it can reasonably be expected that 
the boards of some companies likely would oppose the election of shareholder 
director nominees.”). 
78 75 Fed. Reg. 56770; see also 75 Fed. Reg. 56668–01 n. 1011.  The 
Commission also sought to distinguish between costs that the company would incur 
by including a shareholder candidate without a fight, such as printing and mailing 
new proxy materials and costs that are borne by the company to fight that same 
candidate.  75 Fed. Reg. 56770 n. 1011.    
79 75 Fed. Reg. 56770.  
80 Id. 
81 Petr’s Opening Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014800, at *39 
(Feb. 25, 2011) (No. 10-1305) (citing Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 
133, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2005), asserting that while the Commission cited some of the 
figures submitted by commenters, but not endorsing them or providing their own, 
the Commission failed a basic “statutory obligation to do what it can to apprise 
itself . . . of the economic consequences of a proposed regulation.”).  
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nominee.82  The Petitioners argued, and the court agreed, that the 
Commission’s assertion that companies would simply choose not to 
oppose a shareholder nominee was speculation.83  The opinion 
pointed to comments submitted to the Commission during the 
comment period.84  One comment from the American Bar 
Association said that companies would be, in fact, compelled to resist 
shareholder nominees.85  The Commission used the complete 
opposite rationale to justify the rule, reasoning that shareholders 
would face resistance from management if they tried to institute a 
proxy access policy under current laws.86  The Commission said that 
“companies . . . could frustrate shareholder efforts to establish 
procedures for shareholders to place board nominees in the 
company's proxy materials by litigating the validity of a shareholder 
proposal establishing such procedures, or possibly repealing 
shareholder-adopted bylaws establishing such procedures.”87  The 
conflict in logic is quite apparent as the Commission basically states 
that boards both will and will not be compelled to resist shareholder-
nominated director candidates. 
                                                          
82 75 Fed. Reg. 56770 (“Some commenters, in fact, characterized the costs 
incurred . . . as discretionary because Rule 14a-11 itself does not require such 
efforts.”).  Id. 
83 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also 
Pet’r’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable, 2011 WL 2014800, at *19 (“the Commission 
cited no basis that the companies would opt to ‘simply’ include access candidate 
material . . . without mounting strenuous opposition.”). 
84 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1150. 
85 Id. (citing a letter sent to the Commission during the comment period by 
Jeffrey W. Rubin, Chair, Comm. On Fed. Regulation of Sec., Am. Bar. Ass’n, to 
SEC 35 (Aug. 31, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-
09/s71009-456.pdf (stating that if nominee of the shareholder or shareholder group 
is “determined . . . not to be as appropriate a candidate as those to be nominated by 
the board’s independent nominating committee . . . , then the board will be 
compelled by its fiduciary duty to make an appropriate effort to oppose the 
nominee . . . ”)).  See also Pet’r’s Final Br., 2011 WL 2014800, at *19–20 (citing a 
very similar comment from the American Bar Association). 
86 75 Fed. Reg. 56672 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
87 Id. (emphasis added).  The Commission was expressing concern that not 
all states have incorporation laws like Delaware’s, which provide forums for 
shareholders to nominate directors.  Id.  Also inadequate were opportunities 
provided by company bylaws because the board may put up significant obstacles, 
such as litigation, to avoid a shareholder’s proxy access policy being passed.  Id.  
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The court agreed that the Commission “relied upon 
insufficient empirical data” to conclude that Rule 14a-11 would 
improve the performance of company boards and increase company 
value for shareholders by facilitating the election of shareholder 
nominees.88  The court also noted that the Commission cited 
numerous compelling studies submitted by commenters that forecast 
reduced performance of boards with dissident members, but then 
came to the conclusion that Rule 14a-11 would increase board 
performance and shareholder value.89  For example, a report 
submitted by NERA Economic Consulting stated that “[t]he benefits 
predicted by the SEC will be at best small, and possibly prove to be 
costly rather than beneficial.”90  The report cited three benefits 
forecasted by the Commission and rated them “from small to simply 
implausible.”91  First, the report stated that the only direct savings to 
shareholders, $18,000 in postage and printing costs, represented 
about two percent of the estimated costs that a company would incur 
as a result of having a shareholder nominee on the ballot.92  
Secondly, the report noted that the while the Commission touted 
increased transparency and better informed voting, they did not make 
any attempt to quantify this benefit.93  Third, despite the great weight 
of evidence indicating reduced board performance in these scenarios, 
the Commission hypothesized that board performance would be 
increased by the mere presence of shareholder nominated directors, 
or at least because directors would work harder at their jobs in order 
to stay in their positions.94  The report also stated that firms where a 
                                                          
88 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1150–51. 
89 Id. 
90 ELAINE BUCKBERG, PH.D. & JOHATHAN MACEY, REPORT ON EFFECTS OF 
PROPOSED SEC RULE 14A-11 ON EFFICIENCY, COMPETITIVENESS AND CAPITAL 
FORMATION 22 (NERA Economic Consulting Aug. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.nera.com/upload/Buckberg_Macey_Report_FINAL.pdf (Dr. Buckberg 
is the Senior Vice President of NERA; Professor Macey is a Sam Harris Professor 
of Law, Corporate Finance & Securities Law at Yale Law School). 
91 Id. at 22. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 22–23. 
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dissident director was elected underperformed their peers by nineteen 
to forty percent during the two years following the election.95 
The court found that the Commission “completely 
discounted” those studies and chose to rationalize Rule 14a-11 based 
on two “relatively unpersuasive studies.”96  The first was the Cernich 
study, which focused on “hybrid boards”–boards with some dissident 
directors.97  The second study was on the effects of proxy contests on 
shareholder value in general.98  The Commission actually noted that 
the Cernich study was limited99 and that the findings of the study 
related to the creation of shareholder value were “difficult to 
interpret.”100  Nonetheless, the Commission decided Rule 14a-11 
would still improve board performance and shareholder value.101  
This was in light of its substantial cost and the fact that the 
Commission itself referred to its evidence in support of the rule as “at 
best ‘mixed’ empirical evidence.”102 
The opinion found further fault where the Commission 
sourced the costs and benefits of the rule to companies, shareholder 
value, and the economy as a whole.103  The Petitioners argued that 
the Commission often dismissed or discounted the costs of Rule 14a-
                                                          
95 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151. 
96 Id. (Stating that the Commission relied “exclusively and heavily” on these 
two studies, the first being CHRIS CERNICH ET AL., EFFECTIVENESS OF HYBRID 
BOARDS (IRRC INSTITUTE FOR CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY May 2009), available 
at www.irrcinstitue.org/pdf/IRRC_05_09_EffectiveHybridBoards.pdf (may have to 
alternately click on download link available at 
http://www.irrcinstitute.org/projects.php?project=36)).  The second study is J. 
Harold Mulherin & Annette B. Poulsen, Proxy Contest & Corporate Change: 
Implications for Shareholder Wealth, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 279 (1998). 
97 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56668 n. 911). 
100 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151. 
101 Id. (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56761).  The Commission also reasoned that the 
presence of Rule 14a-11 would improve board performance and shareholder value 
by causing boards to be more responsive, and thus better; it would also improve, of 
course, the actual election of dissident shareholders.  Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 
1151. 
102 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151. 
103 Id. 
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11 as costs that were already borne under state laws.104  Conversely, 
when considering benefits enjoyed while using the rule, it counted 
them as new benefits gained under the rule.105  The court cited the 
Commission’s allocation of negatives, such as distraction to 
management and the loss of time the board may devote to long term 
planning, as being associated with the long-standing state law right 
that shareholders have to nominate and elect dissident directors.106   
The court found that the Commission’s logic was illogical and stated 
that its use in economic analysis was “unacceptable.”107  
Another example of unsubstantiated conclusions and 
inconsistent allocation of costs and benefits is the Commission’s 
theory that the rule would increase shareholder value because of 
“better decision-making” arising from increased board 
transparency.108  Rule 14a-11 provided that if a company negotiated 
                                                          
104 Id. 
105 Id.  An additional example of the Commission’s analysis style is the 
stated assertion that boards may reexamine their procedures for shareholders to 
nominate a director candidate.  75 Fed. Reg. 56765.  The Commission concluded 
that boards may incur costs resulting from a re-evaluation of these policies, but 
then dismissed these costs as only being limited “to the extent that the new rules 
improve the overall efficiency of the director nomination process and lead to 
improvements in the existing procedures for director nominations.”  75 Fed. Reg. 
56765 (Sept. 10, 2010).  The Commission’s reasoning was that where those types 
of costs existed, they would be attributed to something else, or at the very least 
those costs would only be linked to a rule where the rule resulted in an 
improvement to shareholders. 
106 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151.  Petitioners pointed out the 
Commission, in considering the benefits of the rule, “did not once state that they 
arose from state law.”  Pet’r’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 
2014800, at *33. 
107 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151 (the court analogized this type of logic 
to the logic the Commission relied on, and the court rejected, in Chamber of 
Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2005), stating the “rule would not 
create ‘costs associated with the hiring of staff because boards typically have this 
authority under state law,’ and assuming that ‘whether a board is authorized by law 
to hire additional staff in no way bears upon’ the question whether the rule would 
‘in fact cause the fund to incur additional staffing costs.’”) (emphasis added). 
108 75 Fed. Reg. 56765 (Sept. 16, 2010) (“The additional communication 
between a board and the company's shareholders may lead to enhanced 
transparency into the board's decision-making process, more effective monitoring 
of this process by shareholders, and, ultimately, a better decision-making process 
by the board.”). 
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with a nominating shareholder or group and the board agreed to 
include the nominee, the nominee would count towards the 25% 
maximum dissident director limit under 14a-11.109  Of course, this 
calculation assumes, against the evidence, that the board would 
negotiate with nominators and include their nominee.  This figure 
also assumes the negotiations would result in increased board 
transparency and that this transparency would be beneficial.  Finally, 
the Commission did not give any reason why the shareholder’s 
increased influence over the board would result in better value.  No 
evidence was provided to support the theory that shareholder 
expertise in a given industry is superior to that of the management.  
In his scholarly article on the role of institutional investors in 
corporate governance, prominent securities attorney and corporate 
analyst Robert Vanecko states that “[i]ncreased activism by 
American institutional investors is unlikely to improve corporate 
performance because American institutional investors do not have the 
expertise to monitor and discipline management.”110  He goes on to 
point out that many public pension funds “act like politicians rather 
than investors,” especially with politically charged issues, and that 
“[p]ublic pension funds are typically directed by politicians.”111 
Ruling that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
by using these rationalizations to promulgate Rule 14a-11 was a solid 
response by the Court and in accordance with precedent from 
recently decided cases.112  It is a well-known axiom in law that it is 
not enough to point to a condition, like a state law right that could 
possibly result in a cost, as the actual reason a cost being incurred.   
The Commission’s conclusion, that costs may be avoided simply by a 
                                                          
109 Id. 
110 Robert G. Vanecko, Regulations 14A and 13D and the Role of 
Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 376, 406 
(1992) (referring to American investors specifically because institutional investors 
in some other countries he discusses have much more business experience in the 
industry in which they invest, whereas it is uncommon in the U.S.). 
111 Id. at 413. 
112 See Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 143 (stating that whether state 
law authorized an additional expenditure did not bear upon whether the rule would 
in fact cause additional expense); American Equity Life Insurance Co. v. SEC, 613 
F.3d 166, 178 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating that even if costs are “associated” with state 
law rights, the Commission still has an obligation to assess and consider the 
“economic implications” of the rule). 
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board not objecting to a candidate or shareholders not using the rule, 
was wishful thinking.  The assertion that a board would have no good 
faith purpose for opposing a dissident candidate presupposes 
dissident candidates will be equally or better qualified than the 
candidates a board nominates.  The Petitioners pointed out numerous 
sources of opposing data, such as the American Bar Association 
letter from Jeffrey Rubin, concluding that a board has a fiduciary 
duty to oppose less suited candidates; the Cernich study, which 
predicted poorer performance by dissident boards; numerous 
comments from business leaders; and the off-point studies that the 
Commission chose to rely on.113  While discussing shareholder 
proposals that could affect director positions, Professor David Porter 
stated that such proposals “could be viewed as extremely threatening 
by the directors” and that they might “fight the[m] . . . tooth-and-
nail.”114 
Further, the Commission did not dispute the substantial cost 
figures given for the cost of proxy fights, but it did not accept them 
as reliable either.  There is no way of knowing what the Commission 
believed the costs to be, except that the Commission determined 14a-
11 would increase shareholder value and that its benefits would 
justify the costs.  As the Petitioners pointed out, it made little sense 
for the Commission to consider limited use of the rule as a basis to 
assess the rule’s cost; speculating on overall limited use does nothing 
to address the cost each time the rule is used. 
Considering all these points, it is readily apparent that the 
court was correct to decide that the Commission failed to consider 
the rule’s effect on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.  
Even if it had an estimate, how could the Commission properly 
                                                          
113 See generally Pet’r’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 
2014800 (Feb. 25, 2011) (No. 10-1305). 
114 David P. Porter, Institutional Investors and Their Role in Corporate 
Governance: Reflections By a “Recovering” Corporate Governance Lawyer, 59 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 627, 663–64 (2009).  Professor Porter describes a scenario 
where institutional shareholders propose a measure that, if approved, would require 
board members to get a majority vote to maintain their seat; this proposal is 
analogous to the present case in that both relate to shareholder proposals which 
could threaten a company with losing its board member.  Id.  (David P. Porter is an 
Adjunct Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve University School of Law and 
a retired partner of the Cleveland Office of Jones Day, where he worked from 
1981-2008). 
    
Fall 2012 Business Roundtable v. SEC  741 
consider costs of the rule when it was brushing significant costs aside 
(regardless of the amount it estimated the costs to be) as not 
attributable to the rule? 
 
2.  Shareholders with Special Interests 
 
The court next addressed the Petitioners’ argument that the 
Commission failed to consider an important problem which could 
arise from use of Rule 14a-11, specifically how special interests such 
as unions, government pension funds, and hedge funds would use 
Rule 14a-11 to further their own narrow interests at the expense of 
shareholders as a whole.115  The Petitioners argued that the 
Commission received substantial commentary arguing that unions 
and other special interests would use the rule to gain concessions that 
did not increase shareholder value.116  In the adopting release, the 
Commission pointed to comments it received regarding issues on 
independent board chairman, majority voting, and cumulative voting 
as a way to demonstrate the “degree of interest in using Rule 14a-11” 
by inferring interest in these issues to predict interest in using 14a-
11.117  The Petitioners contended that the study which the 
Commissioners relied upon “unwittingly confirmed the role unions 
and government funds would play under the rules” by pointing out 
that the study showed that two-thirds of all those proposals were 
submitted by union and government funds.118  Petitioners bolstered 
this argument by pointing to the Georgeson Report used by the 
Commission, which showed that out of thirty-nine proposals to adopt 
majority voting requirements for directors, thirty-eight were from 
                                                          
115 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151.  Petitioners argued that the 
Commission neglected its duty, “entirely fail[ing] to consider an important aspect 
of the problem . . . .”  Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
116 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d. at 1151–52. 
117 75 Fed. Reg. 56743 n. 804 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
118 See Pet’r’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014800 at 
*39–40 (stating that the Commission “unwittingly confirmed the role unions and 
government funds would play under the rules” and referencing a report relied upon 
by the Commission that estimated that two-thirds of shareholder proposals related 
to independent board chairmen, majority voting, and cumulative voting were 
brought by union and government pension funds). 
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union and government funds.119  Likewise, they were responsible for 
twenty-three out of twenty-seven shareholder proposals to require an 
independent chairman.120  Indeed, in the adopting release the 
Commission referred to “shareholders who link the recent financial 
crisis to a lack of responsiveness of some boards to shareholder 
interests.”121  This list included eighteen individuals or entities, ten 
being union or government pension funds.122 
The court, agreeing with the Petitioners that unions and other 
special interests would be most likely to use Rule 14a-11, noted the 
Commission’s acknowledgement123 that companies and shareholders 
would be injured if special interests used Rule 14a-11, but came to 
the “conclusion that ‘the totality of the evidence and economic 
theory’ both indicate the rule ‘has the potential of creating the benefit 
of improved board performance and enhanced shareholder value.’”124 
The Commission reasoned that these costs may be limited by 
the parts of the rule that limited shareholder or group eligibility, such 
as the requirement to hold three percent of the company’s voting 
stock for at least three years, and would limit use of the rule to those 
who had a long-term commitment to the company.125  In other words, 
the Commission believed the rule would be used by shareholders 
who are interested in shareholder value.126  They also reasoned that 
shareholders are aware of the valuable and limited time board 
                                                          
119 Id. at *40 (citing the Georgeson Report (2010) considered by the 
Commission at 75 Fed. Reg.56743 n. 804) (Georgeson, Inc. is a major provider of 
strategic shareholder consulting services).  The Georgeson Report is available at 
http://www.georgeson.com/usa/acgr.php. 
120 Id. 
121 75 Fed. Reg. at 56670 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
122 See id. at n. 29. 
123 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1152  (the court noted that the Commission 
did not consider the problem in haec verba (meaning “in these words” or that 
something is recited in the exact language)). 
124 Id. (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56761). 
125 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1152.  The Commission reasoned that other 
protections existed and cited that in addition to the narrowing of potential 
nominating entities, the provision allowing only one dissident director on the board 
or twenty five percent of the board, whichever is greater, via Rule 14a-11 would 
also limit a degradation in board effectiveness.  75 Fed. Reg. 56766 (Sept. 16, 
2010). 
126 75 Fed. Reg. 56766 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
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members have and that shareholders would be loath to waste board 
time on a distracting proxy fight.127  In addition, the Commission 
believed that the company’s shareholders could be alerted to 
candidates who may not have shareholder value in mind, giving them 
the information to make an informed vote.128  The Commission 
further concluded that once a dissident director was elected, the 
director’s fiduciary duty would prevent him or her from taking any 
action that benefitted a special interest at the expense of the 
shareholders.129 
The Petitioners argued that the Commission failed to address 
concerns that the rule would impose burdens on companies, 
regardless of whether the dissident nominee is elected, due to the cost 
of succumbing to demands that have nothing to do with shareholder 
value, threatening a nomination for use as leverage to extract 
concessions from the company, or the cost of opposing and defeating 
the dissident nominee.130  The court echoed multiple commenter’s 
remarks, stating that “as more than one commenter noted, ‘public and 
union pension funds’ are the institutional investors ‘most likely to 
make use of proxy access.’”131  However, it did not express complete 
                                                          
127 75 Fed. Reg. 56765 (Sept. 16, 2010) (“The cost also may be offset to the 
extent that shareholders understand that the board's time and other resources are in 
scarce supply and will take these considerations into account in deciding to 
nominate directors, recognizing that the cost of a distracted board may not justify 
pursuing their own specific concerns.”). 
128 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1152.  
129 75 Fed. Reg. 56766 (reasoning that a dissident director, once elected, 
would have the same fiduciary duties as the other board members). 
130 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1152.  Petitioners asserted that the 
Commission never used the word “union” (except where they listed their submitted 
comments) throughout the final rule despite the great amount of comments 
received related to shareholder activism by unions and other special interests.  
Pet’r’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014800, at *41.  Petitioners 
further argued that the Commission’s argument that shareholders would not wish to 
waste the valuable time of board members was exactly why threatening a proxy 
fight could be used as leverage by activist shareholders.  Id. 
131 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1152 (citing a letter from Jonathan D. 
Urick, Council of Institutional Investors, to SEC (Jan. 14, 2010) at 2, available at 
http://www. cii.org/UserFiles/file/resource% 20center/correspondence/2010/1–14–
10% 20Proxy% 20Access% 20Comment% 20Letter.pdf [hereinafter Urick Letter] 
(expressing support for Rule 14a-11 while acknowledging that it would impose 
costs upon companies)). 
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ease of use by pension funds and unions.  The comment said that 
because of diversification policies, almost all institutional investors, 
and even larger funds, hold only small interests in public 
companies.132  Assuming this is generally accurate, these special 
interests would need to collaborate in order to qualify to use Rule 
14a-11.  However, a study of the fifty largest companies, as 
determined by market capitalization, indicates this would not involve 
much collaboration, if any.133  Of the fifty companies that the top five 
institutional investors most commonly invested in, the aggregate 
amount of outstanding shares they owned ranged from 7.6% to 
33.5%.134  In almost all of the fifty companies they most commonly 
invested in, the percentage was in the upper teens or twenties.135 
Despite the Commission’s responses that the rule would 
promote use by investors interested in shareholder value, the court 
agreed with the Petitioners that the Commission, at the very least, 
failed to respond to numerous concerns regarding use of Rule 14a-11 
by activist institutional shareholders.136  The opinion highlighted the 
Commission’s failure to respond to numerous and serious comments 
that unions, along with state and local governments, often have 
special interests in jobs that may far outweigh any interest in share 
value.137  For example, in his article, Vice Chancellor Leo Strine 
opined that “unlike the individual investors whose capital they use to 
wield influence, institutional investors and their advisors bear far less 
of the residual risk of poor voting decisions, as their compensation 
turns more on short-term factors than on long-run growth.”138  In 
                                                          
132 Urick Letter, supra note 131, at 2. 
133 See Elaine Buckberg, Ph.D. & Johathan Macey, Report on Effects of 
Proposed SEC Rule 14a-11 on Efficiency, Competitiveness and Capital Formation, 




136 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1152. 
137 Id. 
138 Leo E. Strine, Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist 
Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 1759, 1765 (2006) (cited in Pet’r’s Final Br., 2011 WL 2014800, at *10, *17, 
*40 (No. 10-1305)).  (Chancellor Leo E. Strine is the Chancellor of the Delaware 
Court of Chancery (he was Vice Chancellor during the comment period), a Law 
Dragon, a Robert B. and Candace J. Haas Lecturer on Law at Harvard Law School, 
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another scholarly article submitted to the Commission, Professor 
Stephen Bainbridge wrote: “the two classes of institutions most likely 
to make significant use of those powers—union and state and local 
employee pension funds—are precisely the classes most likely to 
misuse those powers in the pursuit of private benefits.”139  
Bainbridge concluded that the involvement of active investors in 
company management will contradict “the very mechanism that 
makes the widely held public corporation practicable: namely, the 
centralization of essentially nonreviewable decisionmaking authority 
in the board of directors.”140  Naturally, there was great concern that 
special interests could be expected to pursue self-interested 
objectives which would likely cause companies, at a loss to the 
economy as a whole, to spend significant sums of money and time to 
fight dissident nominees regardless of whether the nominee could 
win.141   
In her legal article provided to the Commission on the role of 
labor in corporate governance, Marlene O’Connor stated that “unions 
have devised innovative strategies to use shareholder rights to 
exercise unprecedented power over managers.”142  O’Connor also 
wrote that while most unions limit their influence to “so-called” 
governance practices that promote shareholder value, she pointed to 
                                                          
and an Adjunct Professor of Law at both the University of Pennsylvania and 
Vanderbilt University Law Schools). 
139 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy And Shareholder 
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1751 (2006).  (Stephen Bainbridge is 
the William D. Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at UCLA where he 
primarily teaches corporate law). 
140 Id. at 1749. 
141 Id. (citing as an example the Detailed Comments of Business Roundtable 
on the Proposed Election Contest Rules and the Proposed Amendment to the 
Shareholder Proposal Rule 102 (August 17, 2009), available at 
http://businessroundtable. org/uploads/hearings-
letters/downloads/BRT_Comment_Letter_to_SEC_on_File_No_S7–10–09.pdf 
(“state governments and labor unions . . . often appear to be driven by concerns 
other than a desire to increase the economic performance of the companies in 
which they invest” (citing Strine, supra note 138, at 1765)).  See also Georgeson 
Report, supra note 119 (stating that the level of dissident success during elections 
has dropped to 31%). 
142 Marleen O’Connor, Labor’s Role in the American Corporate Governance 
Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J 97, 110 (2000) (cited in Pet’r’s Final Br., 
Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014800, at *10, *17, *40, *45). 
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the AFL-CIO’s steps to “develop a worker-shareholder view of the 
firm to account for the needs of workers more directly”143 and cited 
the AFL-CIO’s increased practice of organizing other union pension 
funds to amass large groups of shareholders in order to coordinate 
their voting power.144 
Under Rule 14a-11, nominating shareholder(s) were required 
to certify that they were not “holding the company's securities with 
the purpose, or with the effect, of changing control of the company or 
to gain a number of seats on the board of directors that exceeds the 
maximum number of nominees that the company may be required to 
include under Rule 14a-11.”145  It is no wonder that this provision did 
not sway the court to rule for the Commission.  As explained above, 
a shareholder does not have to be seeking control of the company in 
order to cause significant cost and disruption.  Nor can a simple 
pledge by a nominating investor, claiming to harbor no intent to 
effect control of the company, be reassuring to the management or 
the remainder of shareholders who will bear the burden of a proxy 
fight.  As Strine points outs, institutional investors do not “owe 
fiduciary duties to the corporations whose policies they seek to 
influence.”146  While counting the percentage of dissident 
shareholders on a board is fairly simple, proving intent is difficult.   
Petitioners pointed to recent examples of union pension fund 
activism at shareholders’ expense using a Wall Street Journal article 
regarding the financial advisory firm, Lazard Ltd.147  The American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Workers (AFSCME) 
                                                          
143 Id. at 97. 
144 Id. at 110. 
145 75 Fed. Reg. 56675 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
146 Strine, supra note 138, at 1765. 
147 See Pet’r’s Initial Reply Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 758644 
(Feb. 25, 2011) (No. 10-1305) (citing Raise My Company’s Taxes, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (Jan. 12, 2011), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703779704576073980682909272.
html.).  The article refers to AFSCME’s pressure against not only Lazard, but other 
companies, to include in annual reports information about risks that are created by 
the company’s efforts to reduce their tax owed to federal, state, and municipal 
entities.  The article quotes AFSCME’s “director of capital strategies” that 
AFSCME is “trying to challenge the assumption that everyone makes that it’s 
always better for shareholders to pay as little taxes as you can.”  Id. 
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pension plan invests in Lazard stock.148  AFSCME, whose 1.6 
million members receive their income and pension plans through 
taxes, sent a letter to Lazard arguing that tax regulators “may 
‘challenge’” Lazard’s tax avoidance and minimization structure.149  
To protect against what AFSCME apparently assumed to be a threat 
to shareholders, even though it cited no wrongdoing of Lazard, it 
called on Lazard to detail its tax strategy in the annual report.150  The 
inference and assumption AFSCME made is that it is improper to 
consider tax minimization to always be in the best interest of 
shareholders.151  Lawfully minimizing any expense is not a concept 
that should require justification or explanation.  Nor should a 
company have to make public its strategy, which affects its 
competitiveness, simply to placate a special interest.  The seemingly 
obvious interest AFSCME has in companies not avoiding taxes lies 
in increasing tax revenues to ease pressure on governments to reduce 
expenditures on salaries and pension benefits, both of which directly 
affect AFSCME’s narrow interests. 
To exercise influence over a company’s management, a 
special interest group does not need to effect control of the company.  
It is enough just to exert undue pressure.  Rule 14a-11 would have 
provided that fulcrum.  For every expense or burden the management 
faces, its fiduciary duty will compel it to evaluate the cost of the 
response and the practicability of that response.  The greater the cost 
or burden, the greater the likelihood that that board will give 
something up because the cost of resisting the burden may be greater 
than the cost itself.  Naturally, it could be nearly impossible to 
                                                          
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. (also warning Lazard and other companies that AFSCME was pushing 
for regulations to force them to publish company tax strategy in their annual 
reports).  
151 Pet’r’s Initial Reply Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 758644 
(2011).  See also Shutting Up Business – Now Unions Are Turning to Shareholder 
Proposals to Limit Political Speech, WALL STREET JOURNAL, (Dec. 28, 2011), at 
A14, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204224604577030260580411048.
html (discussing efforts by major unions to force companies to disclose their 
political donations in order to facilitate the unions’ ability to stop company 
contributions to political causes that the unions do not agree with). 
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entirely measure the long-term effects when compared with all the 
other factors that affect a company’s performance. 
The court determined that the Commission should have given 
greater consideration and further explanation to those concerns, 
stating, “by ducking serious evaluation of the cost that could be 
imposed upon companies from use of the rule by shareholders 
representing special interests, particularly union and government 
pension funds, we think the Commission acted arbitrarily.”152  The 
Circuit ruled appropriately, as the Commission left unaddressed 
serious effects 14a-11 could have upon shareholders.  The 
Commission failed to “examine the relevant data and articulate a 
satisfactory explanation for the facts found and the choice made.”153  
Because of this, the Commission failed to apprise itself of the 
relevant information necessary to balance the cost of the rule against 
its benefits.  Accordingly, the rule was found to be arbitrary and 
capricious. 
 
3.  Frequency of Election Contests 
 
The court took note of the number of estimated election 
contests that would involve 14a-11.  When the Commission first 
proposed the rule they estimated that 269 companies would use Rule 
14a-11 each year to propose nominees.154  When the Commission 
published the adopting release, it revised the figures to a total of 
fifty-one companies, citing the more restrictive change in eligibility 
requirements set forth in the adopting release as the reason for the 
change.155  The Petitioners argued that such a drastic change was 
unreasonable given that the Commission stated that the ownership 
threshold it adopted makes it possible for “a significant number of 
shareholders either individually or a number of shareholders . . . [to] 
satisfy the holding requirement.”156  The Petitioners further argued 
that the Commission failed to reconcile the apparent inconsistency 
that such a significantly smaller group of eligible shareholders or 
shareholder groups would somehow attain the claimed benefits of 
Rule 14a-11, as opposed to traditional proxy contest methods, if it 
                                                          
152 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
153 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983). 
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was so much harder to qualify for eligibility to use 14a-11.157  
Petitioners premised this argument on the Commission’s reliance on 
the “frequent” use of “direct printing and mailing cost savings” when 
tallying the benefits of 14a-11.158 
The court agreed with the Commission that the total number 
of shareholder attempts to nominate directors may be higher with 
14a-11, but that revising the estimate from 269 to 51 was not 
arbitrary and capricious.159  The Commission argued, in contrast to 
14a-11’s three year/three percent requirement, that “[o]ne who has 
owned a single share for one day can start a traditional proxy contest 
. . . .”160  Even with 14a-11 in place, shareholders would still have 
traditional proxy contest methods available as before.161  That the 
total number of efforts by shareholders to nominate dissident 
directors will be higher when shareholders have two ways to 
nominate a director, rather than one, is a reasonable conclusion.162 
Absent dramatic extremes in the requirements to use 14a-11, it would 
                                                          
154 See Proposing Release, SEC, 74 Fed. Reg. 29024, 29064 (June 18, 2009).  
The Commission estimated that 208 companies under the Exchange Act and 61 
registered investment companies would receive Rule 14a-11 nominations.  Id. 
155 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1152–53.  The Commission stated in the 
Adopting Release that the estimated number of companies eligible to make 
nominations under Rule 14a-11 would decrease to 51, 45 Exchange Act companies 
and six registered investment companies.  75 Fed. Reg. 56743–44.  The 
Commission further stated this decrease was due to the heightened requirements to 
be eligible under 14a-11 such as the three year holding and three percent ownership 
requirements.  Id. at 56744. 
156 Pet’r’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014800 at *36 
(emphasis removed) (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56692). 
157 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1153; see also Pet’r’s Final Br., Bus. 
Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014800, at *36–37; see also 75 Fed. Reg. 56756 
(Sept. 16, 2010). 
158 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d. at 1153 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56756). 
159 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1153.   
160 Respondent’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014799 
(Feb. 25, 2011) (No. 10-1305). 
161 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d. at 1153.  Nominations can be conducted 
under traditional methods such as those available under state law, or under 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14a–8, which permits a wide variety of shareholder proposals and 
requires lesser eligibility requirements; Rule 14a-8 is not challenged in this case, 
but is referenced throughout the releases and briefs as another shareholder proposal 
method. 
162 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d. at 1153. 
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likely be difficult to predict with any specificity what difference 
changes to the qualification requirements would have on the number 
of nominees produced exclusively from the new rule. 
Next, the court determined that the Commission acted 
arbitrarily when balancing the cost and benefits of using Rule 14a-11 
as related to the total number of proxy contests initiated under all 
methods available to shareholders.163  Petitioners argued that the 
Commission neglected to estimate how many proxy contests, as 
defined by those which would otherwise occur under the traditional 
methods currently available, would be replaced by those under Rule 
14a-11.164  Pointing to a failure to adequately inform themselves of 
the net effect on the number of total director proxy contests, the court 
stated that, although the Commission foresaw beneficial results 
because Rule 14a-11 would “mak[e] election contests a more 
plausible avenue for shareholders to participate,”165 without this  
“crucial datum,”166 the Commission had no way of knowing whether 
the rule would result in enough contests to be of net benefit—
assuming that it becomes a net benefit at some point.167  What the 
APA required from the Commission was an analysis of what the 
expected increase in shareholders would be.  It would do little good 
to impose Rule 14a-11 upon the investing public without knowing 
how many Rule 14a-11 nominations occurred relative to traditional 
methods.  If the number of times Rule 14a-11 would be used 
approximated a decrease in the use of methods already available, 
then the Commission would have arbitrarily placed another 
regulation with little to no net benefit. 
The court found the Commission’s analysis of the estimated 
rate of the use of Rule 14a-11 was “internally inconsistent” and thus 
arbitrary.168  In the adopting release, the Commission forecast 
savings to shareholders using Rule 14a-11 because it imposed the 
cost of printing and mailing proxy material directly onto the 
company, and this shift would naturally spur nominations that were 
                                                          
163 Id.  
164 Id.  
165 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1153 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56761 (Sept. 16, 
2010)) (emphasis added). 
166 Id.  
167 Id.  
168 Id.  
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otherwise foreclosed due to those costs.169  The court pointed to 
letters the Commission used to support its theory, which stated that 
approximately fifteen percent (several hundred) of companies listed 
on the stock exchanges expected to receive a nomination (recall that 
the Commission revised its estimate to fifty-one) for directors under 
14a-11.170  The court agreed with the Petitioners that the Commission 
projected frequent use of the rule when tallying the benefits.171  This 
estimate was a contradiction of the lower estimate the Commission 
gave when projecting Rule 14a-11’s total costs at other parts in the 
release, particularly when calculating costs of solicitation and 
campaigning.172  
 
B.  Application of the Rule to Investment Companies 
 
At this stage the court already determined that Rule 14a-11 
was arbitrary and capricious.  Still, the court took up the Petitioners’ 
concerns regarding the application of the rule to investment 
companies in the event that 14a-11 is modified and re-imposed.173  
The court echoed the Petitioners’ point that investment companies 
are already covered by the various other laws that afford investors 
protections not available to shareholders of regular stock owned 
companies, such as the Investment Company Act (ICA).174  The 
Commission argued that the ICA provides a “panoply” of protections 
to shareholders of investment companies, but reasoned – as it did in 
its adopting release – that the ICA only provides added protections to 
state corporate laws.175  It next argued that the ICA does not deal 
                                                          
169 Id.  See also 75 Fed. Reg. 56756 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
170 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1153–54.  One comment the Commission 
relied on is a letter based on the Proposal and a survey of company directors.  See 
75 Fed. Reg. 56756 n. 872 (letter from Kenneth L. Altman, President, The Altman 
Group, Inc., to SEC (Jan. 19, 2010) at 3, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7–10–09/s71009–605.pdf). 
171 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1154. 
172 Id. at 1150–51, 1154. 
173 Id. at 1154.   
174 Id. (using as an example 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a), which requires a vote by 
the majority of shareholders to change a fund’s “sub classification”). 
175 See Respondent’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014799, 
at *51 (Feb. 25, 2011) (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56684 & n. 141). 
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with state law proxy access rules or a shareholder’s ability to 
nominate a director under state laws, a fact that the Commission 
discussed in the Adopting Release as well.176  To further justify the 
application, the Commission referred to the substantial 
responsibilities of investment-company boards, such as the approval 
of advisory contracts.177  Petitioners pointed out that the ICA actually 
does require shareholder approval of advisory contracts.178   
As previously explained, investment companies are often 
governed by unitary or cluster boards.179  In responding to comments 
the Commission received espousing the efficiencies gained by boards 
governing multiple funds as well as the threat to efficiency under 
Rule 14a-11, the Commission acknowledged that the rule may 
decrease efficiency due to disrupted board structures.180  Dismissing 
the Commission’s argument that the “policy goals and the benefits of 
the rule justify these costs,”181 the court stated that it “erroneously 
attributed” the costs to existing state law rights.182  The Commission 
also determined that the costs of Rule14a-11 would be lower for 
investment companies as there are fewer institutional investors able 
to meet the three-year holding requirement.183  Further, there would 
not be as many opportunities for director elections because not all 
states require an annual board meeting.184   
Another theory the Commission advanced was that 
disruptions to unitary or cluster boards could be avoided by using 
confidentiality agreements.185  In response to this, the Petitioners 
                                                          
176 Id. at *52 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56,684; 56,763; 56,766). 
177 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1154–55 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56684). 
178 Id. at 1154–55 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a), and analogizing to 
American Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 178–79 
(D.C. Cir. 2010), finding the Commission’s analysis incomplete for failure to 
determine whether protections existed under another regulatory regime and thus 
failing to consider the benefits of the rule and promotion of efficiency). 
179 Id. at 1155 (citing Rubin, supra note 85, at 61–62). 
180 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1155 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56684). 
181 75 Fed. Reg. 56684 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
182 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1155. 
183 Id. (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56,685 (Sept. 16, 2010)). 
184 Id. (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56685). 
185 Id. (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56685); see also Respondent’s Final Br., Bus. 
Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014799, at *55–56 (responding that confidentiality 
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argued that the Commission received numerous comments explaining 
that “directors would have no obligation to sign such agreements and 
the agreements would not prevent the loss of attorney-client 
privilege.”186  The Commission’s final rationale was that 
shareholders could avoid or acquiesce to any cost increases or 
efficiency reductions if they chose not to elect the dissident director 
once they were provided with warnings that electing the director may 
result in increased costs and a disruption of the board structure.187 
Holding that the Commission acted arbitrarily, the court 
described the Commission’s application of Rule 14a-11 to investment 
companies as “unutterably mindless.”188  The court found that the 
Commission’s rationale in applying the rule to investment companies 
was akin to the same logic rejected in earlier parts of the case—that 
the rule was economically justified because it would only burden 
shareholders if it was actually used.189  Ultimately, it held that the 
Commission failed to sufficiently consider whether the application of 
14a-11 to investment companies was necessary given the 
requirements and protections already imposed under the ICA.190   
This was an accurate response by the court.  The 
Commission’s assertion that the ICA does not govern proxy access 
the same way that Rule 14a-11 will is insufficient, especially since 
the Commission acknowledged that significant protections exist for 
shareholders of investment companies.  One of the central tenets 
offered in justification of Rule 14a-11 was that boards would be more 
accountable to shareholders, a far broader goal than shareholder 
oversight of “advisory contracts.”  Even if it is true that the net of 
state and federal regulations covering investment companies is 
similar to that covering operating companies, it does not mean that 
state laws addressing proxy access are insufficient simply because 
the ICA does not specifically cover proxy access.  The burden is still 
                                                          
agreements could be made a condition of appointment; that the Petitioners’ 
assertion that dissident directors would not sign the agreement because it was 
voluntary is speculative; and that concerns that a confidentiality agreement might 
be too broad to be enforced was unsupported). 
186 Pet’r’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014800, at *55. 
187 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1155 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 56684). 
188 Id. at 1155–56. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 1156. 
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on the Commission, as the court pointed out, to “‘determine whether, 
under the existing regime, sufficient protections existed’ to advance 
the stated benefits of the rule and to promote efficiency.”191  Given 
the issues related to the costs of Rule 14a-11, it seems the 
Commission fell quite short of justifying the costs of the rule against 
its benefits.   
While the Commission argued that the Petitioners had no 
solid basis for contending that directors would not voluntarily sign a 
confidentiality agreement, it missed the mark because it would not be 
adequate even if the Commission had been correct.  Given the costs 
and burdens that Rule 14a-11 would likely impose, requiring a 
confidentiality agreement seems insufficient.  A dissident shareholder 
could exert great pressure on a board even without getting elected 
and there is always the chance that the director could simply refuse to 
sign the agreement after he won.  At that point, the horse has left the 
barn and remaining at issue will be whether the company is supposed 
to hold another costly election, keep the seat empty until the next 
election, bring in the second place candidate, or reinstate the previous 
director.  These possibilities may be somewhat more remote and even 
repairable through adjusting the rule.  On balance, it seems that the 
Commission did not give much serious consideration to how the rule 
applies to investment companies, and this was arbitrary and 
capricious. 
 
C.  The Rule Precluded Shareholders From Forming Their Own 
Shareholder Nomination Procedures Under State Laws 
 
To prevent future conflict and economize judicial, 
Commission, and commenter resources, the court should have 
addressed the Petitioners’ claim.  The Petitioners’ (including the 
State of Delaware’s amici) argument was that the Commission 
arbitrarily rejected proposals calling for Rule 14a-11 to permit the 
shareholders of individual companies to decide whether to enact 
dissident nomination mechanisms.192  Bolstering the Petitioners’ 
                                                          
191 Id. at 1155 (citing American Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v. 
SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 178–79 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). 
192 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149.  Petitioners argued that 14a-11 
imposed a proxy access mechanism that shareholders would be stuck with, without 
giving them the opportunity to seek such corporate policies under their current state 
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claim, the State of Delaware, as amicus curiae, argued that its own 
securities laws would be at odds with Rule 14a-11.193  Delaware’s 
argument was bolstered by support from its bar association, warning 
of “significant” stripping of rights currently available to 
shareholders.194  The Commission responded that 14a-11 actually 
helped promote state law policies of shareholder nomination rights 
and that it did not contradict state laws because Rule 14a-11 would 
not apply if a company’s governing documents or the applicable state 
laws entirely “’prohibit shareholders from nominating candidates for 
the board of directors.’” 195  The Commission added that a company 
or state could change the terms of its nomination procedure, so long 
as any shareholder or group meeting the 14a-11 requirements could 
still submit a nominee.196 
The court certainly could have addressed the Petitioners’ 
argument as it could very well come up during a future rulemaking 
session.  The Commission basically asserted that since Rule 14a-11 
did not prohibit other avenues for shareholders to nominate directors, 
it did not conflict with shareholder’s state law rights.   
                                                          
rights.   Pet’r’s Opening Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2010 WL 5116461, at *46–
47.  Petitioners pointed out that 14a-11 left shareholders with no way to modify, 
repeal, or broaden the ability of shareholders to nominate and elect director 
candidates.  Id.  Petitioners further argued that the Commission inconsistently and 
incorrectly concluded that 14a-11 protected a shareholder right granted under 
federal law, but then apparently found that only certain shareholders had this right.  
Id. 
193 Final Br. of the State of Delaware, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 
2014797, at *2.  Delaware argued that 14a-11 is “completely contradictory to 
Delaware’s newly adopted statute governing proxy access.”  Id.  It reasoned that 
14a-11 took away the shareholder rights of Delaware companies by disregarding 
the State’s law permitting shareholders to determine their own company’s bylaws 
as provided under Delaware law.  Id. at *1–2.  See also Delaware General 
Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112, 113 (West 2012).  See also 
Pet’r’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014800, at *51 (citing a 
comment submitted to the Commission from the Delaware State Bar Association 
warning that “[r]ule 14a-11 would deprive stockholders and boards of directors of 
significant rights and powers under state law”). 
194 Pet’r’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014800, at *51. 
195 Respondent’s Final Br., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2011 WL 2014799, at 
*31–32 (emphasis added). 
196 Id. at *32. 
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Equally flawed was the Commission’s argument that Rule 
14a-11 is not contradictory to state law shareholder rights because it 
does not apply to a company where the bylaws or state laws prohibit 
shareholder nomination of director candidates.  In order to avoid the 
rule altogether, a company or state would have to ban shareholders 
from nominating directors, an obvious burden to expect a shareholder 
to accept.  Not only did this provision fail to increase shareholder 
access under state laws, it forced states, companies, and shareholders 
to choose whether to accept Rule 14a-11 or completely rid 
themselves of any shareholder rights to nominate a director 
candidate. 
 
V.  IMPACT 
 
The judges of the D.C. Circuit have again prevented an 
arbitrary and capricious rule from being foisted onto the public’s 
shoulders.  If upheld, Rule 14a-11 would have served little purpose 
other than providing a means through which certain shareholders can 
exercise their personal interests at the expense of the remaining 
shareholders.  While it is possible to do this under the traditional 
methods if an election is won and the insurgent directors win a vote 
for reimbursement, it generally must be done initially at the expense 
and inconvenience of the dissenting shareholders.   
Another positive impact of this case is that it refines the 
Commission’s rulemaking methods in light of Dodd-Frank.197  The 
Commission will have to readjust its idea of what sort of federal 
regulations must be in place in order for shareholders to be 
adequately represented on company boards, to the extent that they 
should be.  Unfortunately, the court’s decision not to rule on whether 
shareholders were already sufficiently protected under existing state 
laws and proxy access rules leaves the Commission the opportunity 
to pursue another rule like 14a-11.  It is difficult to say whether the 
Commission will do so.  From the information provided by the court 
and parties to this case, combined with information available from 
other sources, it looks like it will be very difficult for the 
Commission to formulate another rule that is similar in any 
                                                          
197 See Casey, infra note 198. 
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meaningful way to Rule 14a-11 without getting the same response 
from the courts.  
A future rule with the same stated goal as 14a-11 is 
nonetheless a reality.  In her statement during the announcement of 
the adopting release, Commissioner Kathleen Casey stated that the 
Commission incorrectly believed it was putting this issue to bed by 
issuing Rule 14a-11.198  She was clearly correct, as the rule is now 
null.  The issue is not at rest.  Commissioner Elisse Walter 
subsequently stated that the Commission was finally adopting “the 
first effective mechanism to facilitate shareholder nomination and 
voting rights.”199  Despite this case, there is little question that the 
Commission believes that it needs to institute a rule to further 
facilitate shareholders’ state law right to nominate and elect directors.  
After the court’s ruling, Chairman Schapiro released a statement 
declaring  
 
I firmly believe that providing a meaningful 
opportunity for shareholders to exercise their right to 
nominate directors at their companies is in the best 
interest of investors and our markets . . . I remain 
committed to finding a way to make it easier for 
shareholders to nominate candidates to corporate 
boards.200     
 
As the court stated, the Petitioners and the authors of their 
supporting amicus curiae briefs made it quite clear that shareholders 
can either exercise sufficient influence over companies, or divest 
themselves of the company.  Rather than seek to layer on additional 
proxy access rules, the Commission will need to more diligently 
improve its oversight capabilities provided under current laws.  After 
all, the Commission failed to establish why shareholders were not 
being adequately protected.  If shareholders are not satisfied with a 
                                                          
198 Kathleen L. Casey, Commissioner, Speech at SEC Hearing (Aug. 25, 
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch082510klc.htmI.d. 
199 Elisse B. Walter, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Speech by 
SEC Commissioner: Opening Statement at the SEC Open Meeting Speech at SEC 
hearing (Aug. 25, 2010), available at   
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch082510ebw.htm. 
200 See Schapiro Press Release, supra note 6. 
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current board of directors, they have the power (which they often 
exercise) to nominate a new director if the bylaws provide for it.  
They also have the power to vote with their feet, or choose not to 
purchase the stock in the first place.   
The Commission’s rules will continue to be deemed arbitrary 
and capricious if it continues to insist that a minority of shareholders 
can impose substantial proxy contest expenses upon the rest of the 
shareholders, to say nothing about the consequences of a candidate’s 
election.  Of course, if a candidate is elected, it is apparently what the 
shareholders en masse wish, and they will reap the rewards or 
negative consequences accordingly.  Indeed, efficient market theories 
seem to indicate that this is already happening to the extent 
shareholders want. 
     Public sentiment seems to indicate a growing desire for 
more accountability of company managers.  As discussed earlier, 
shareholders are left with fewer methods of nominating directors, but 
that does not mean that shareholders may not exercise the extensive 
rights that they already have.  Because of the direct and indirect costs 
to companies, combined with the obvious potential (and probability) 
for abuse by special interests, the vacation of Rule 14a-11 has likely 
left shareholders better off than they would have been with it.  More 
does not necessarily equal better. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Society must balance the rights and privileges it grants to 
individuals.  Congress enacted the APA to prevent the government 
from usurping these rights, regardless of whether they are 
purportedly enacted to protect people’s rights.  By vacating Rule 14a-
11, the court has prevented an abuse of the Commission’s regulatory 
power in the name of shareholders’ rights.  Moreover, the opinion 
gives guidance to the Commission as to its powers, responsibilities, 
and expectations under Dodd-Frank.  If the Commission chooses to 
exercise its rulemaking authority to promote another rule designed to 
facilitate shareholder nomination of director candidates, it will have 
to do so within the constraints of this precedent. 
